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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2143 
___________ 
 
JAMES A. YATES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRYAN A. BLEDSOE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 11-cv-00592) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellant’s Motion to Reopen; Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Appeal In 
Forma Pauperis and Affidavit in Support Thereof, Pursuant to Rule 24, Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure; and for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 27, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 15, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 James A. Yates appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and from the court’s subsequent order denying his motion 
for reconsideration.  We will affirm. 
In 1997, Yates was convicted by a jury of various drug offenses in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.  Yates 
thereafter filed a motion in October 2001 seeking to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 on the basis of, inter alia, the alleged ineffective assistance rendered by defense 
counsel.  The District Court denied Yates’ § 2255 motion, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently denied his request for a certificate of 
appealability. 
In May 2005, Yates – confined in the Middle District of Pennsylvania – filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in that District Court.  In 
addition to raising ineffective assistance of counsel and due process claims, Yates 
claimed an entitlement to habeas relief on account of his “actual innocence” under United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The District Court dismissed Yates’ petition for 
lack of jurisdiction after concluding that he failed to demonstrate that § 2255 would be 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.  We agreed with the District 
Court’s determination that Yates could not meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements 
of § 2255’s safety valve provision, and summarily affirmed its decision.  Yates v. Smith, 
190 F. App’x 113 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential). 
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Yates was likewise unsuccessful with a motion for reduction of sentence filed 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 in June 2008.  He fared no better with his application for 
leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion filed in the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. O’Brien, __ U.S. 
__, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010), Yates claimed that his mandatory life sentence is 
unconstitutional because its imposition required additional facts neither charged nor 
found by the jury.1
Undeterred, Yates returned to the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania two months later with yet another petition for writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Once again, Yates advanced a claim based on United 
States v. O’Brien which, as the District Court noted, he argued changed the legal 
landscape regarding the distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing factors.  
Yates claimed specifically that his mandatory minimum life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 
848(b) for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”) is unconstitutional 
  The Court of Appeals denied the § 2244 application after concluding 
that Yates had attacked his sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) on direct appeal and that 
authorization to file a § 2255 motion containing such a claim – even one advanced under 
a different theory – was thus barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).  Yates v. United States, 
No. 11-1010 (7th Cir. filed Jan. 18, 2011). 
                                              
1  In O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 924, the statute 
prohibiting the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a violent or drug trafficking 
crime, possession of a machinegun “[was] an element to be proved to the jury beyond a 
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because the indictment did not charge, and the jury never found, that he was a principal, 
organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise involving at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine 
base.    
The District Court dismissed Yates’ § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction after 
concluding that his claims challenged the legality of his conviction and sentence and, 
therefore, were within the purview of a motion under § 2255.  The District Court further 
concluded that § 2255 was not inadequate or ineffective so as to authorize the pursuit of a 
habeas corpus petition, and rejected Yates’ argument that he should be able to proceed 
under § 2241 with his claim that he is “actually innocent” of being a principal in the CCE 
and, thus, of the resulting mandatory life sentence.  The District Court determined that 
O’Brien is not an intervening change in the law and, moreover, that it did not have the 
effect of rendering Yates’ conduct non-criminal.  In fact, it found that O’Brien was not 
even directly applicable to Yates.  Finally, the District Court noted that Yates’ inability to 
satisfy § 2255’s gatekeeping requirements before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
was an insufficient reason to allow him to pursue a § 2241 petition raising the same 
claim. 
 Yates sought to have the District Court reconsider its determination with a motion 
filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  Citing to the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
DePierre v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011), and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 
                                                                                                                                                  
reasonable doubt,” not a “sentencing factor” to be proved to the judge at sentencing.  130 
S. Ct. at 2172, 2180. 
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U.S. 196 (1948), Yates argued that § 2241 was the appropriate remedy for a challenge to 
his 1997 conviction because his claims are based on a new statutory interpretation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 and 848(b).  In particular, Yates claimed that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in DePierre, 131 S. Ct. at 2227-28, that the references to “cocaine base” 
in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), meant not just cocaine base in crack form but all forms of 
cocaine base, rendered his indictment deficient and the evidence presented at trial 
insufficient to support the resulting conviction.  This is so, according to Yates, because 
the jury was not asked to consider the type and quantity of controlled substance involved 
in the offense.  Noting that Cole – a 1948 case – was certainly not an intervening change 
in law, and that Yates made no attempt to demonstrate that DePierre rendered his conduct 
innocent, the District Court denied reconsideration. 
Yates filed a notice of appeal.  He was directed to pay the filing and docketing 
fees to the District Court or to submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”).  
While Yates timely delivered his ifp motion to prison officials, it was delayed in reaching 
this Court and his appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the fees.  He was notified that if 
he wished for his ifp motion to be considered, he had to file a motion to reopen.  Shortly 
thereafter, Yates filed a motion to reopen the appeal. 
We grant Yates’ motions to reopen and to proceed ifp on appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s decision to dismiss Yates’ § 2241 petition is plenary, see Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. 
Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002), and we review the District Court’s order 
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denying his motion filed under Rule 59(e) for an abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood 
Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
A § 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a 
federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  See Davis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  A habeas petitioner may seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided 
by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.  See In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).  A § 2255 motion is not “inadequate or 
ineffective” merely because the petitioner cannot meet the stringent gatekeeping 
requirements of § 2255, see Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120, or because the sentencing court 
does not grant relief.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  Rather, the “safety valve” provided 
under § 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply in unusual situations, such 
as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a 
crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.  See Okereke, 
307 F.3d at 120 (citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).   
We agree with the District Court that § 2241 is not the proper means for raising 
the claims Yates seeks to advance in the underlying petition.  We further agree that Yates 
has not demonstrated that a § 2255 motion provides an inadequate or ineffective remedy 
in this case.  As Yates himself appears to concede, the cases he cites –  United States v. 
O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010), and DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011) –
do not reflect an intervening change in law which renders the crimes of which he was 
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convicted non-criminal.  Additionally, even accepting, arguendo, his contention that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in those two cases represent a significant change in statutory 
construction or interpretation regarding the particular provisions at issue, Yates has failed 
to demonstrate how either of these cases could have an effect on his conviction or 
sentence as neither case has been held retroactively applicable. 
Yates had a prior opportunity to challenge his sentence under § 2255, and he did 
so, albeit unsuccessfully.   A § 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely 
because a petitioner cannot meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255.  
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.  It follows, as the District Court concluded, that § 2241 is not 
the proper means of raising these claims and the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
address them.    
 For the foregoing reasons and because the appeal presents no substantial question, 
we will summarily affirm the order of dismissal and the District Court’s subsequent order 
denying reconsideration.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
